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Although identifying the existence and the nature of household level poverty traps would 
have important implications for the design of poverty reduction policies empirical 
evidence is still scant.  A small, but growing empirical literature has begun testing for 
poverty traps as thresholds in non linear welfare dynamics. Employing a variety of 
quantitative methods it has produced a variety of conclusions.  This paper uses a uniquely 
long household panel from three villages in rural India to examine whether the detection 
of poverty traps may be contingent on the quantitative method used to model household 
welfare dynamics. It then employs a novel semiparametric panel data estimator that 
combines the advantages of the existing methods. Since in the context of dynamic 
poverty traps we are primarily concerned with expected, structural well being it measures 
household welfare in assets. Structural immobility in these Indian villages is pervasive. 
Household asset holdings are stagnant over time. Absent any structural changes, the 
currently poor are likely to remain poor, suggesting a strong type of poverty trap that is 
qualitatively different from a dynamic thresholds type poverty trap. While all types of 
households face static asset holdings, higher castes, larger landholders and more educated 
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1  Introduction 
Alleviating poverty is one of the key challenges for the new millennium. Meeting this 
challenge requires effective poverty reduction policies. Designing these policies, in turn, 
requires an understanding of the underlying welfare dynamics that determine how 
individuals and households escape or fall into poverty over time. Policy makers need 
information on two key issues: First, what are the levels of well being that households are 
expected to reach over time and does this level of well being differ across types of 
households. One can think of these levels as dynamic household welfare equilibria that 
households can reach given current economic opportunities and returns to their assets. 
Second, how do households move towards these equilibria? Does their well being 
improve or worsen steadily or are there potential non linearities in their underlying 
welfare dynamics potentially with associated dynamic poverty traps? 
 
Precisely identifying the level and shape of household welfare dynamics has very 
practical policy implications. If there is but one dynamic equilibrium, the key questions 
then would be what this equilibrium level of welfare is relative to the poverty line and 
how quickly households move towards it. If it is sufficiently high for households to 
escape poverty, then policy can focus on speeding up the convergence process. In 
contrast, a dynamic equilibrium below the poverty line would suggest that eventually all 
households are expected to be trapped in poverty. Overcoming such a structural poverty 
trap would require structural changes that provide new economic opportunities for 
households that raise their equilibrium level of welfare. 
 
If, instead, there are multiple dynamic welfare equilibria, a household’s long term 
welfare depends on its initial condition. If it starts above a dynamic threshold, in 
expectation it will move towards a higher level of welfare. A starting position below the 
threshold would put it onto a path towards another, low level equilibrium. If this lower 
level of welfare lies below the poverty line then the threshold point would constitute the 
entrance to a second type of poverty trap. Clearly, the policy response in such a world 
would differ markedly from the single equilibrium case. It would require social policies 
to lift households above the threshold point and social protection measures to ensure that 
households don’t fall below the thresholds in the aftermath of adverse shocks. A short 
term public investment in these social policies could harness the dynamic welfare process 
and yield large long term welfare benefits. Again, for the policies to be efficient, we 
would need to identify the precise location of the threshold point.  
 
To get at these issues this paper employs the novel semiparametric panel data estimator 
developed in Naschold (2009). It tries to identify the shape of welfare dynamics and 
precisely locate dynamic welfare equilibria for households in three villages in semi arid 
peninsular India. Case studies in the small existing empirical literature on household level 
welfare dynamics have focused on Sub Saharan Africa. This paper contributes the first 
case study for India using the newly expanded ICRISAT Village Level Studies panel 
dataset which now spans 27 years with 13 observations per household. The long time  
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span and the frequent observations make these data ideally suited to exploring the shape 
of long term household welfare dynamics and their associated equilibria. 
 
The empirical results suggest that these village economies are characterized by economic 
stasis. Levels of household well being are effectively static. Absent any shocks, over time 
household asset holdings follow a random walk where a household can expect to remain 
at its current level of asset welfare. Crucially, this holds throughout the welfare 
distribution: the poor stay poor, and the non poor stay non poor.
1 
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section summarizes three 
competing theories of household welfare dynamics and provides a stylized theoretical 
framework that guides the analysis in this paper. Section 3 reviews the small empirical 
literature on modeling non linear household welfare dynamics. Sections 4 and 5 
introduce the data and construct the asset index that is needed for the subsequent asset 
dynamics analysis. Section 6 provides a summary of the econometric methods. Results 
are presented in section 7. Section 8 concludes.  
 
 
2  Theories of Welfare Dynamics 
 
Three main hypotheses from the macroeconomic literature on growth dynamics can 
inform the analysis of micro level dynamic poverty traps: unconditional convergence, 
conditional convergence and multiple dynamic equilibria (2006).  
 
The concept of unconditional convergence originates from the Solow growth model. In 
the context of household level dynamics it suggests that all households eventually 
gravitate to the same long term equilibrium, based on the assumption that asset dynamics 
for all households follow a common, concave, monotone Markov process. The dynamics 
underlying the conditional convergence hypothesis are the same. It expands the 
unconditional convergence concept simply by allowing exogenous subgroups to have a 
different dynamic path and equilibrium. 
 
A priori, there is no clear reason why asset dynamics should follow an autoregressive 
process of this form. On the contrary, at least four theoretical models suggest that 
different types of nonconvexities can result in multiple dynamic equilibria and poverty 
traps if the lower stable equilibrium is below the poverty line. 
 
First, the efficiency wage hypothesis (Mirrlees 1975; Stiglitz 1976; Dasgupta and Ray 
1986; Dasgupta 1997) links worker productivity and earnings. Only if a worker can 
afford to consume more than a minimum level will he be productive and, hence, 
employed. Others who are unable to afford the minimum level of consumption remain 
poor. Second, limited access to credit or formal and informal insurance can limit a 
                                                 
1 In the context of these villages one cannot speak of ‘rich’ households, as even the richest households 
would be considered relatively poor in most contexts.  
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household’s ability to invest in human capital (Loury 1981; Galor and Zeira 1993) or in 
an income generating opportunity (Banerjee and Newman 1993). As a result any 
household dynasty starting below a certain level of wealth, or suffering a shock large 
enough to let it fall below this threshold, will be trapped in poverty. Third, if participating 
in society and finding employment require minimum levels of expenditure (Bradshaw 
1993; Parker 1998), then poor households can be permanently ‘socially excluded’. 
Fourth, child labor models (Basu 1999; Emerson and Souza 2003) suggest that poor 
households that have to send their children to work instead of school are trapped in 
intergenerational poverty since as adults these children do not possess the qualifications 
to access opportunities to escape poverty.  
 
All these theoretical models have similar policy implications: if there are multiple 
dynamic equilibria with one stable equilibrium below the poverty line then the misfortune 
to start with low asset holdings or the realization of downside risk are structural causes of 
chronic poverty. Conversely, poverty traps and long term poverty could be eliminated if 
every household can be lifted above the unstable equilibrium threshold and if safety nets 
ensured that they remained there. Hence, one off social expenditures would not only 
benefit households in the current period, but also result in higher welfare in all future 
periods. Current social expenditure would yield high long run returns. 
 
The above theoretical models can be stylized by recursion diagrams in household asset 
space as shown in Figure 1. The recursion functions denote expected household asset 
accumulation paths. The horizontal and the vertical axes display household asset holdings 
in the previous and in the current time period, respectively At+1and At. Any point on the 
45 degree line represents a dynamic asset equilibrium. Function f1(At) illustrates the case 
of multiple dynamic equilibria where the dynamic asset accumulation path crosses the 
45 degree line several times. A precondition for the existence of multiple equilibria are 
non convexities over at least a part of the asset domain. If the poverty line lies above A* 
then the unstable equilibrium point A’ indicates a dynamic asset poverty threshold. 
Above this threshold point and absent any negative asset shocks households can be 
expected to accumulate further until they reach the high level long run equilibrium point 
A**. Below A’ households are on a trajectory which, in expectation, makes them poorer 
over time, moving towards the low level poverty equilibrium at A*. 
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Figure 1 Stylized Asset Recursion Diagram for Different Shapes of the Asset Accumulation Path 
 
 
Since these threshold points represent unstable equilibria a priori we might expect them 
to lie in a low density region of the distribution (Barrett and McPeak 2005), because in 
equilibrium households would be at either of the two stable equilibrium points. If this is 
the case we need estimation techniques that can identify these unstable equilibria using 
relatively few data points around A’. Fully parametric techniques would be at a clear 
disadvantage as the estimated polynomial function would be driven by the mass of 
observations around A* and A**, likely leading to imprecise estimation of threshold 
points such as A’. 
 
The first alternative hypothesis of unconditional convergence can be represented by 
expected the asset recursion function f2(At). This would be consistent with a structural 
poverty trap if B** lies below the poverty line. The second alternative hypothesis, 
conditional asset convergence, would imply one such function for each exogenously 
determined subgroup. In the analysis below subgroup membership is defined by caste, 
landowning class, location of the household or its education level. Figure 1 illustrates the 
case of two subgroups. One follows f2(At) while the other is on trajectory f3(At) with each 
function having its own distinct dynamic accumulation path and asset equilibrium. As a 
result, in the conditional convergence case poverty traps could be subgroup specific. 
 
Even in the absence of multiple equilibria and poverty traps, there may be a case for 
helping the poor escape poverty through redistributive policies that i) benefit them in the 
form of immediate transfers and ii) raise mean asset levels in subsequent periods. We can 
express future mean asset holdings as a function of households’ current assets. If this 
function is strictly concave, as indicated by f2(At) and f3(At) in Figure 1, then future mean 
assets are a strictly quasi concave function of households’ current assets. Therefore, 
reducing current asset inequality would increase mean future asset levels (Aghion et al. 






A’  A**  A*            A’        B*  A** B** 
f2(At) 
f3(At)  
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Again, this would imply that redistribution can support poverty reduction if the gains for 
the poor from redistribution are larger than any potential negative effects on economic 
growth. Testing for concavity of the recursion diagram using household data is therefore 
a micro level test analogous to the test for the effects of inequality on economic growth 
in the cross sectional macro literature (for a summary see Banerjee and Duflo (2003)). 
 
Finally, it is worth noting that none of the above theories consider the speed of 
adjustment back to equilibrium as that is ultimately an empirical question. The models 
can only assume that households are ‘temporarily’ away from their respective stable 
dynamic equilibria (A* and A** in the case of multiple dynamic equilibria, B* and/or 
B** for unconditional and club convergence). This temporary deviation would be due to 
shocks causing asset losses or gains. Of course, in reality, depending on the speed of 




3  The Empirical Literature on Modeling Welfare Dynamics 
 
Compared to the well developed theoretical literature on welfare dynamics there is a 
relative dearth of empirical studies. The paucity of this literature is primarily due to the 
lack of suitable household panel data, but also to the empirical difficulties involved in 
modeling household welfare dynamics.  
 
In terms of estimation methods the few existing studies have modeled household welfare 
dynamics either fully parametrically or nonparametrically. Existing parametric studies 
have limited themselves to a first order autoregression model. While longer lags could 
affect the dynamic welfare path, they also reduce the number of usable observations and 
use up degrees of freedom in the estimation. 
 
Three published studies have used a model of this form. Two use the flow variables 
income and consumption to measure household welfare; the third is based on the stock 
variable of household asset holdings.
2 For Hungary and Russia, Lokshin and Ravallion 
(2004) estimate a third degree polynomial in income levels. Jalan and Ravallion (2004) 
use a fixed effect model in differences for rural China. Using income rather than asset 
data, neither of these two studies finds evidence for multiple dynamic equilibria. Both 
papers conclude that current income is a slightly concave function of lagged income. 
Therefore, poorer households would take longer to adjust to an income shock and are 
expected to move towards the single equilibrium more slowly than richer households. In 
contrast, Barrett et al. (2006) use asset data from Northern Kenya to estimate changes in 
assets as a fourth degree polynomial function of past assets, controlling for household and 
time specific effects. They detect nonlinear asset dynamics with one unstable threshold 
point and two stable equilibria suggesting the existence of dynamic poverty traps. 
                                                 
2 Each measure has advantages and drawbacks for analyzing welfare dynamics. The beginning of section 5 
explains why I chose household assets as the welfare measure in this paper.  
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One key problem with such parametric specifications is that if the unstable threshold 
points lie in an area with few observations, which the theories reviewed in the last section 
suggest, we need a large enough sample size that the fitted polynomial function can 
accurately reflect the few observations around the thresholds. If the sample size is too 
small the observations near the threshold point may not be picked up by the polynomial, 
but instead enter as heteroskedastic and positively autocorrelated error (Barrett 2005). 
Also, while high order polynomial functions present a way to adjust the coefficients so 
that in the centre of the domain the function exhibits the desired nonlinearities, they can 
make the function move around wildly towards in the tails of the distribution. This is to 
be expected from statistical theory (Hastie et al. 2001) and indeed is what Barrett et al. 
(2006) find in practice.  
 
Three studies have tried to address these problems by using nonparametric estimation 
techniques. For Northern Kenya Barrett et al. (2006) run locally linear nonparametric 
bivariate LOWESS regressions of current herd size on its three month lagged value. 
Lybbert et al. (2004)  run the same type of nonparametric regressions but on one and ten 
year lagged herd size in Southern Ethiopia. Adato et al. (2006) analyze household asset 
dynamics in South Africa using local regression methods.
3 All three studies using 
nonparametric techniques have found evidence for asset poverty traps. 
 
Clearly, both estimation techniques used in the existing literature have limitations. 
Polynomial parametric techniques don’t perform well with few observations around 
potential inflexion points. Nonparametric estimation is constrained in practice by how 
much it can control for other variables. Statistically, these two techniques mark the two 
extremes of the trade off between the flexibility of the functional form and the ability to 
control for other covariates. Semiparametric techniques combine the advantages of 
parametric and nonparametric estimation and seem more suitable for modeling household 




4  The Data 
 
The data are taken from the International Crop Research Institute for the Semi arid 
Tropics’ (ICRISAT) Village Level Studies (VLS). The original first generation data 
(VLS1) was collected for the ten cropping years from 1975/76 to 1984/85. The cropping 
year runs from July to June. Here, I will refer to each year by the starting year only, that 
is, 1975 stands for the cropping year 1975/76. Collection of the second generation data 
(VLS2) started in July 2001 and is ongoing. The data released to date and used for 
analysis in this paper includes the year 2003. 
 
                                                 
3 Their exact regression method is not specified.  
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The VLS1 data collection covered up to 10 villages in three states and a total of 400 
households; the VLS2 spans 6 of those villages in two states containing some 265 
households. The analysis in this paper is based on a subsample of these data selected on 
two main criteria. First, a household had to be included in both VLS1 and VLS2. This 
allows the construction of the longest possible panel spanning a period of 27 years. 
Second, income information had to be available for all years. This limits analysis to three 
villages: Aurepalle in the Mahbubnagar district of Andhra Pradesh, Shirapur in the 
Sholapur district of Maharashtra, and Kanzara in the Akola district of Maharashtra. This 




Between VLS1 and VLS2 there has been some attrition as some households dissolved, 
while some others left the villages. Out of the 104 continuously surveyed household in 
VLS1, 72 could be included in the VLS2 sample. Ideally, we should try to control for the 
probability of attrition econometrically. This is only defensible if there is a variable in the 
survey that influences whether or not a household was resurveyed in VLS2 but which 
does not impact household income. However, the VLS was conceived primarily as an 
agricultural production survey. Hence, its module on household composition and 
characteristics is relatively small and does not contain any variables that can credibly 
identify the attrition probability (such as the place of birth, or the place of residence of 
relatives). The downside of not being able to control for attrition is that the results may 
not be representative for the villages. The attrition bias is likely to come from either end 
of the distribution: better off and more educated households are more likely to migrate, 
while poorer households are more likely to disband, die off entirely, or merge with other 
households. A common factor in explaining attrition in other panels is the age of the 
household head. However, there is no reason to believe that the age factor affects 
household attrition differently for different wealth levels. Moreover, as Alderman et al. 
(2001) and Falaris (2003) show, even high levels of attrition in developing country panel 
surveys often do not affect the consistency of estimation. The upside of using only the 
continuously observed households is that the subsample containing these 72 households 
is a balanced panel. Thus, there is no further attrition bias during the period of analysis. 
 
The VLS survey contains detailed information on key assets such as land, and 
agricultural and financial assets. Information on household composition and education is 
less detailed, but available at the basic level. The key feature that makes the ICRISAT 
VLS data suitable for exploring is the length of the panel. This is useful in two ways. 
First, the long time span covered by the panels makes it suitable to track changes in 
assets which, absent any short term shocks, tend to be slow and may not be detectable in 
shorter panels. Second, unlike the few other panel datasets which cover similarly long 
periods
5 the VLS data have up to 13 observations per household. With that number it 
begins to be possible to estimate household specific asset dynamic curves using fixed 
effects. 
 
                                                 
4 Some households are not included in all VLS2 rounds. 
5 For example, the Chilean data set by Scott with one observation in 1968 and another in 1986.  
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There is a 17 year gap between the last year of data VLS1 (1984) and the start of VLS2 
(2001). There are different ways this can be handled. I annualized the change over this 




As a measure of material well being I use household income rather than consumption. 
Although the permanent income hypothesis suggests that in theory consumption is a 
preferable measure of the economic standard of living, two key factors favor the use of 
income in the case of the VLS data. First, unlike consumption, income data are available 
for all years and all households. And second, there are reliability concerns regarding 
consumption data in the early years of data collection (Walker and Ryan 1990). 
 
The VLS data collection was originally stratified into four equal sized landholding 
classes: landless laborer households and small, medium and large landowning 
households. The exact cut off points in acres between the landholding classes differ 
slightly between villages but are around 2.5 acres for small and 5.5 acres for medium 
landowners.
7 This information on landholding classes is used both in the regression 
analysis as well as to analyze asset dynamics by subgroup. 
 
Caste membership is an important determinant both for the initial level of household 
well being as well as for opportunities for economic advancement. For information on 
household caste membership I use Ryan’s caste rank index (Walker and Ryan 1990) 
which classifies all castes into one of four groups with caste rank 1 containing the highest 
castes. Having four caste ranks reduces the number of necessary dummies in the 
subsequent regressions and makes the analysis of asset dynamics by subgroups more 
tractable.  
 
Other variables are more standard and include household size, age of and years of 
education completed by the household head, and the number of working age adults and 
the number of children in the household. Variables are adjusted for household size and 
expressed in per adult equivalent terms
8 whenever appropriate. The construction of the 




                                                 
6 As a robustness check for this crude annualization I repeated the analysis dropping the 1984 2001 period 
altogether. The results did not change significantly. Thus, everything reported below uses the annualized 
data for 1984 2001. 
7 For more information on variable definition and on sampling procedures see Singh et al. (1985) and 
Walker and Ryan (1990) 
8 The adult equivalence scale was taken from (Ryan et al. 1984) who count men as 1 adult equivalent, 
women as 0.9 and children under 12 as 0.39 adult equivalents. In this paper I follow the VLS data standard 
and define children as anyone below 14. As a result the adult equivalent conversions using the Ryan et al. 
is incorrect for anyone aged 12 and 13.  
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5  Constructing the Asset Index 
I use a definition of household welfare and poverty based on the stock variable asset 
holdings rather than a flow variable such as income or consumption. This focus on assets 
is for three reasons. First, the economic well being of a household is dependent on its 
stock of assets. From a dynamic perspective it is the accumulation of assets which over 
time enables households to earn enough income to move out of poverty.
9 This makes an 
asset based measure of household welfare more suitable for forward looking policy 
design. Second, asset levels fluctuate less from day to day than income and, thus, are 
closer to the measure of structural well being that is ultimately of interest to forward 
looking policy design. Assets can be interpreted as measuring the underlying structural 
well being of a household whereas income, and to a lesser extent consumption, contains a 
much larger amount of stochastic variation (Carter and May 2001). Third, surveys tend to 
measure asset holdings more accurately than income or consumption. It is easier for a 
household to recall, and for enumerators to verify, how much X it has than how much it 
spent on Y or received in payment over the last fourteen days.  
 
Unlike income or consumption, assets are multidimensional. Moreover, unlike income 
and consumption which is measured  in monetary units and can, thus, be easily 
aggregated, assets are typically measured in different units, such as acres of land owned, 
years of education, or numbers of various types of livestock owned. To quantitatively 
analyze household asset dynamics we, therefore, need to summarize the different classes 
of assets into a single household asset index. This dimension reduction is particularly 
helpful when using nonparametric and semiparametric estimation techniques as it 
circumvents the curse of dimensionality and, thus, makes estimation possible with the 
small sample sizes commonly found in household survey data. 
 
The asset index is constructed through a livelihood regression (Adato et al. 2006) which 
expresses household well being as a function of household characteristics and asset 
holdings.
10 The fitted values of this regression can be interpreted as a asset index in 
which assets are weighted according to their marginal contribution to household i’s well 
being.  
 
Let household i’s subsistence need be the product of household size in adult equivalent 
units and the poverty line, and denote it by Si. Further, let  it ℓ be a measure of i’s 
livelihood at time t, expressed as the ratio of its real income yit to its subsistence need: 
/ it it it y S = ℓ . Hence,  it ℓ measures a household’s well being in poverty line units (PLUs). 
This provides an intuitive normalization for  it ℓ and, hence, the asset index: A measure of 
1 means that a household survives on an adult equivalent income right at the poverty line; 
                                                 
9 Productivity and technologies and relative terms of trade are equally critical for a household’s escape 
from poverty, but technologies and terms of trade are not state variables of the same sort as assets. 
10 An alternative way to construct an asset index is to use the first principal component from a principal 
components analysis of all relevant assets. Using the Indian VLS data and in earlier work on Ethiopia and 
Pakistan (Naschold (2006)) I find that the pattern of asset dynamics does not substantively vary across the 
two alternative methods of constructing the asset index. In the following I use the livelihoods regression 
methodology as the unit of the resulting asset index has a more intuitive interpretation (see next paragraph).  
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while  1 it < ℓ  and  1 it > ℓ  indicate poor and non poor households, respectively. Household 
i’s livelihood in PLUs can be expressed as 
 




it j it it itj s it it its t t i it
j s t
A C T U α β γ δ ε
= = =
= + + + + + ∑ ∑ ∑ A C A C ℓ   (1) 
 
where  ( )
2 0, i iid u U N σ ∼ . Aitj and Cits are the j
th of J assets and the s
th of S household 
characteristics that contribute to i’s livelihood at t. Ait and Cit are control vectors 
representing household assets and characteristics, and Tt  are T 1 year dummy variables. 
Coefficients  ( ) , j it it β A C represent asset j’s marginal contribution to the livelihood. The 
parentheses indicate that the coefficients depend on all of household i’s assets and 
characteristics at time t. 
 
The fitted values yield the estimated household asset indices and are given by 
 
( ) ( )
1 1 2
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ , ,
J S T
it j it it itj s it it its t t i
j s t
A C T U α β γ δ
= = =
= + + + + ∑ ∑ ∑ A C A C ℓ   (2) 
 
To estimate equation 1 we need to construct  it ℓ , which in turn requires setting a poverty 
line. The 1993 Expert Group of the Government of India suggested 49 Rupees per month 
in 1973/74 prices, which is around Rs630 per year per capita in 1975/76 prices. However, 
this would classify close to 90 percent of villagers as poor, including many households 
that would not be regarded as poor in the villages. Instead, I follow recent work by 
Badiani et al. (2007) and use a lower cut off point of 500 Rupees in 1975/76 prices as the 
poverty line. 
 
Equation 1 was estimated using a random effects panel model using a second order 
polynomial expansion of all assets and household characteristics. A random effects model 
is preferred for two reasons: First, a Hausman test against the fixed effects model did not 
reject the null hypothesis that the coefficients are the same. The probability that the 
critical χ
2 value with 74 degrees of freedom is greater than the observed χ
2 of 23.41 is 
equal to one. Second, the fixed effects specification explained only 65% of the variation 
in  it ℓ , compared to 74% for the random effects model; and the primary objective for the 
livelihood regression is to project the household asset index as precisely as possible. 
 
The flexible second order expansion for equation 2 allows the marginal returns to vary 
both with their own levels as well as with the levels of the other included asset and 
control variables. The estimation of equation 1 is based on the subsample of 72 
continuous households. The subsequent asset dynamics analysis is, therefore, not affected 
by attrition though it may suffer from some selection bias.
11 
                                                 
11 As a cross check I also estimated equation 1 by OLS and using the whole sample of 102 continuous and 
non continuous households. This yielded a total four different household asset index estimates. The asset  
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The choice of explanatory variables was informed by the categories of assets identified in 
the livelihoods literature (see, e.g., Moser and Felton (2007)) and spans physical, 
productive, financial, natural and human capital.
12 Specifically, the asset vector Ai 
includes net financial assets, the value of houses, residential plots, productive equipment 
and consumer durables, acreage of dry and irrigated land owned, the number of bullocks 
and other bovine livestock owned. The household characteristics vector Ci contains the 
age and education of the household head, the household size in adult equivalent units
13 
and the number of working age adults to proxy the labor endowment of the household. 
With the exception of the age and education of the household head, all variables were 
expressed per adult equivalent. To center the curvature of the polynomial at the sample 
mean, all asset and household characteristics variables and their squares and interaction 
terms were demeaned. Further, all variables expressed in Rupees, including the poverty 
line, were converted to real 1975/76 Rupees using the state specific Consumer Price 
Index for Agricultural Laborers from Indiastat.  
 
The main objective of this regression is to derive a set of weights to reliably project 
expected household well being given its assets holdings. The focus of this regression is, 
therefore, less on the actual estimated coefficients but on the overall explanatory power. 
The regression has a good fit and can explain about three quarters of the variation in the 
household well being as shown by an R squared of 0.74. These results provide a solid 
justification for using the fitted values from equation 2 as the household asset index.
14  
 
Figure 2 plots the asset index on the vertical axis against its one year lagged value on the 
horizontal axis. The asset index ranges from 0 to 23 PLU, with only 12 observations 
above 12 PLU. The data points are scattered fairly closely to the 45 degree line. This 
suggests a low level of asset mobility and is a priori evidence against nonlinear asset 
dynamics and multiple dynamic equilibria. This simple plot is consistent with overall 
economic stasis in these three rural villages.  
 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
dynamics analysis using the three other asset indices (OLS all households, OLS continuous households and 
RE all households) produced substantively similar asset indices and asset dynamics results. The estimation 
results for all four specifications of equation 1 are given in Appendix A. 
12 The VLS does not provide sufficient detail on social capital. 
13 Strictly speaking I used the subsistence need which is equal to household size multiplied by the poverty 
line. 
14 Results of estimating equation 1 span about three pages. For brevity they are not included here, but are 
available on request from the author.  
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Figure 2 Scatterplot of Asset index against Lagged Asset Index (One year lag) 
 
 
The constant from equation 1 is around 2, suggesting that the average level of household 
well being for a household without assets is around twice the poverty line. The median 
household PLU for VLS1 (1975/6 1984/5) is around 1.5 and for VLS2 (2001/02 2003/4) 
is around 3.2. The relatively high average level of well being is partially a result of four 
factors: First and foremost, household incomes far exceed consumption levels in the 
VLS. While there is no conclusive explanation for this, it is likely due to an 
underestimation of consumption levels (Townsend 1994; Morduch 2004). As a 
consequence, the magnitude of the regression constant of household PLU estimates is 
consistent with widespread consumption poverty headcounts of 76 percent for VLS1 and 
22 percent for VLS2 (Badiani et al. 2007). Second, the period over which households 
have been observed is long. Thus, while average annual growth in assets is low at 0.8%, 
and consistent with economic stagnation, over almost thirty years this does represent 
significant compounded growth and has resulted in much higher income and asset 
holdings in VLS2. Third, due to the regression to the mean effect, the fitted values of the 
asset index span a smaller range than the observed  it ℓ . This results in fewer projected 
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6  Econometric Methods 
In estimating household asset dynamics we face two main econometric challenges. First, 
we need to allow for any arbitrary form of non linear asset accumulation patterns. This is 
best achieved by modeling the autoregressive asset relationship nonparametrically. Using 
a simple univariate nonparametric regression model we can fit a smooth function through 
a scatterplot of assets on lagged assets – as in figure 2   without any assumptions on the 
functional form. Let Ait represent household i’s asset index at time t then dynamic 
autoregression of household assets can be written as 
 
1 ( ) it it it A f A ε − = +  
2 (0, ) it iid N ε ε σ ∼  
(3) 
 
Equation 3 can be estimated using a number of different nonparametric techniques. This 
paper presents results based on penalized spline regression. This method is borrowed 
from the statistics literature (Ruppert et al. 2003; Wand et al. 2005) and has not yet been 
used in applications in development economics. One obvious drawback of using simple 
bivariate nonparametric techniques is that we cannot control for other covariates. 
 
The main analysis in this paper, therefore, employs the new semiparametric panel data 
estimator developed in Naschold (2009) again based on penalized spline regression. This 
estimator combines three desirable features for modeling household asset dynamics and 
is therefore conceptually superior to the techniques used in the previous literature.  First, 
it retains the flexibility of the simple asset autoregression in equation 3 to flexibly model 
the asset autoregression to allow for possibly non convexities in any part of the asset 
range. Second, it can control for other household characteristics, subgroups and time and 
location specific effects. And third, it can be extended for panel data estimation.  
 
The full random household intercept mixed model representation of the this 






it i it it t t it
t
U f T α β γ ε −
=
= + + + + + ∑ X  
( )
2 2 1 , 2 , N 0, , (0, ) i iid u it i N t T U N ε σ ε σ ≤ ≤ ≤ ≤ ∼ ∼  
(4) 
   
where Xit and all Tt enter the model linearly, and the relationship between assets and 
lagged assets is estimated nonparametrically. Vector Xit contains the following time 
varying control variables: The age of the household head and its square control for life 
cycle effects. Similarly, household size and its square control for economies of scale; and 
years of education of the household head and its square account for returns to human 
capital. The number of adults and its square and the number of children and its square 
control for available household labor and dependents, respectively. Also included in Xit 
are the two time invariant household characteristics caste and landholding class. 
Continuous variables, their squares and interaction terms are demeaned to generate an  
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exact second order local approximation at the sample mean. Where appropriate, variables 
are used in per adult equivalent terms. Tt is a time dummy equal to one at time t and zero 
otherwise that accounts for time specific effects.
15 Ui is a random household intercept. 




7  Results 
 
Table 1 reports the estimated locations of the stable dynamic equilibrium household asset 
holdings. The point estimates show only a single dynamic asset equilibrium for the rural 
Indian households and identify a very similar shape for the asset dynamics. This holds 
both for the nonparametric and the semiparametric penalized spline regressions and for 
the one year and the three lag structures. 
 
The shape of the central tendency of households’ asset dynamics is almost linear, 
suggesting that the VLS households accumulate assets very slowly, if at all. As illustrated 
by the scatter plot in figure 2 and as borne out by the recursion diagrams in figure 3 an 
figure 4 below, the VLS villages represent a stagnant economy. Households have a strong 
to tendency remain at their existing level of asset holdings and well being. 
 
The ranges reported in table 1 indicate the estimated dynamic asset accumulation path 
follows the 45 degree line very closely. In the first two columns the low and high values 
in brackets, respectively, show where the lower and upper 95 percent confidence bands 
cross the diagonal. The bracketed numbers, therefore, provide the 95 percent confidence 
interval for the asset equilibrium.  
 
The confidence intervals for the nonparametric penalized splines regression span much of 
the asset range; from 3 to 9 poverty line units. In other words, we cannot reject the null 
hypothesis that, in expectation, no household’s wealth changes from one year to the next. 
This represents a random walk along the 45 degree line and suggests a very strong case of 
economic stagnation. By controlling for covariates as well as allowing for flexible asset 
dynamics, the semiparametric penalized splines allow greater precision in the estimates. 
The confidence intervals for the dynamic asset equilibrium shrink to between 2.4 and 4.1 
PLUs. However, this greater statistical significance does not detract from the 
economically significant result of very slow asset accumulation and overall economic 
stagnation for the VLS households, as even for the semiparametric techniques the asset 
estimated dynamic accumulation path still follows the 45 degree line very closely (see 
figure 4). 
                                                 
15 The first time dummy is T3 for the following reason. Since we are estimating a first order autoregression, 
the first observation for each household is at t=2. If we then omit the time dummy associated with this 
observation, i.e., T2, to represent the base period, the first included time dummy is T3. Similarly, the first 
included time dummy for the three year lag estimations is T5.  
16 A summary of this semiparametric estimator is included in the Appendix. For more details see also 
Naschold (2009).  
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Table 1 Summary of Asset Equilibria Estimates by Estimation Technique and Lag Structure 
    Approximate Location 
of  Stable Equilibrium 
(in PLUs)  
% of observations in 95% 
Confidence Interval of 
the Stable Equilibrium 
    1 year lags  3 year lags  1 year lags  3 year lags 
Nonparametric Regression       





[4.4,6.3]  21%  6% 





[5.4,6.2]  13%  2% 
Semiparametric Regression       





[2.4,4.1]  16%  21% 





[2.7,4.1]  9%  15% 
•  Asset Index estimated by Equation 1 using random effects. 
•  In each cell the line above the brackets indicates a single crossing point or its range. 
•  Ranges in brackets indicate where confidence bands overlap 45 degree line 
 
 
Figure 3 shows the estimated recursion diagram for equation 3 using penalized splines. 
The central red line displays the estimated asset accumulation path. It is almost linear and 
follows the 45 degree line very closely. Hence, on average households do not move much 
from their initial asset position signifying an extremely low level of year on year asset 
mobility in the three villages. The grey areas above and below the curve show the 95 
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The semiparametric penalized splines models produce asset recursions diagrams with the 
lowest dynamic equilibria of all the estimation techniques: between 2.8 PLUs for the one 
year lags and 3.2 PLUs for the three year lags. The semiparametric partially linear mixed 
model with the added random intercept from equation 4 is the preferred specification as it 
produces the tightest confidence bands of all the estimation techniques. Its asset recursion 
diagram is shown in Figure 4. To put these estimated equilibrium asset levels into 
perspective, the median household PLU level for 2001 was 3.1, suggesting that the 
median household had already reached its dynamic equilibrium at around three times the 
poverty line income, which translates into around Rs1500 per adult equivalent. For the 
reasons outlined at the end of section 5, this estimate is likely on the high side. For 
comparison, in 2001 22 percent of households still lived below the low consumption 
poverty line of Rs500 (Badiani et al. 2007). 
 
Overall, the slopes from the semiparametric models are slightly smaller than for the 
nonparametric model, suggesting a somewhat faster, though still very slow process of 
asset accumulation. 
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Figure 4 Semiparametric Estimation of Assets vs. Asset Lagged (Penalized Splines Random Effects) 
One year lag 
 
In addition to the above analysis of the asset dynamics for the whole sample of 
households we can estimate asset dynamics and equilibria by subpopulation. Table 2 
summarizes the results by village, caste rank, landholding class and education based on 
the semiparametric penalized splines estimation with random effects. All subgroups share 
a similar pattern for their estimated dynamic asset accumulation path. The shape of this 
pattern resembles that of the full sample discussed above and is characterized by a single 
dynamic asset equilibrium and a dynamic path that is relatively linear and close to the 45 
degree line. The subgroups differ primarily in the location of their equilibria. 
 
Among the three villages, Aurepalle has the highest dynamic asset equilibrium point 
estimate followed by Kanzara and Shirapur. The difference between Aurepalle and 
Shirapur is also statistically significant as their 95 percent confidence intervals do not 
overlap. This is consistent with the finding that income growth in the Andhra Pradesh 
village Aurepalle has outperformed the Maharashtra villages (Badiani et al. 2007) and 
suggests that economic growth in Aurepalle has managed to sustainably raise the level of 
structural well being as indicated by a higher asset equilibrium. 
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Table 2 Stable Dynamic Asset Equilibria by Subgroups 
  Number of 
observations 
Approximate Location of  
Stable Equilibrium 
 (in poverty line units) 
    Semiparametric 
Penalized Splines 
 (Random Effects) 
By Village     
  Aurepalle  286  4.4 
[3,7] 
  Shirapur  338  2.5 
[2.2,2.8] 
  Kanzara  312  3.5 
[3,4.5] 
By Caste Rank     
  1 (highest)  260  4.2 
[2.7,5.9] 
  2  195  3 
[2.4,6.3] 
  3  247  2.5 
[2.2,2.9] 
  4 (lowest)  234  2.1 
[2,12] 
By Landholding     
  Landless  246  2.8 
[2.5,3.5] 
  Small Landholders  265  2.5 
[2.2,3.2] 
  Medium Landholders  206  3.3 
[2.9,3.7] 
  Large Landholders  219  4.5 
[4,7] 
By Education     
  No Education  544  2.2 
[2,2.8] 
  Up to 4 years  204  4 
[3,6] 
  More than 4 years  188  3 
[2.5,5.5] and [7,15]* 
•  Asset Index estimated by equation 1 using random effects. 
•  * indicates that the equilibrium is driven by very few observations 
•  In each cell the line above the brackets indicates a single crossing point or its range. 
•  Ranges in brackets indicate where confidence bands overlap 45 degree line 
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The analysis by caste confirms the expectation that higher castes enjoy higher asset 
equilibria. The relationship between caste rank and the level of the stable equilibrium is 
monotone. However, the differences in dynamic equilibria are not statistically significant 
across caste ranks as evidenced by the overlapping confidence intervals in Table 2. This 
is due to a combination of heterogeneity within caste ranks and relatively small sample 
sizes for each caste rank.  
 
Similarly, among landowning households, greater acreage systematically increases the 
level of the asset equilibrium. Large landowners enjoy statistically significantly higher 
asset holdings. The differences between the other groups are not statistically significant, 
again probably due to heterogeneity within landholding classes and due to small 
subsamples. Landless households have a slightly higher equilibrium than smallholders, 
but this is likely caused by shopkeepers and civil servants being included in the landless 
category. 
 
Splitting the sample by education level of the household head we see that education raises 
the expected asset equilibrium level. The difference in dynamic equilibria between 
households with uneducated heads and those with up to 4 years of education is 
statistically significant. The highest education category has two equilibria. The one at 
around 3 PLU is likely driven by the larger number of household heads that have 5 or 6 
years of education, thus, hardly more than the ‘up to 4 years’ group. The other, very high 
equilibrium is probably driven by the few household heads that have tertiary education.  
 
I also tested the robustness of the above results against two alternative explanations of 
why we only see one dynamic asset equilibrium. First, social sharing rules may mean that 
any gains in assets by one household are at least partly distributed via its social networks. 
Alternatively, household composition may be endogenous. If a household manages to 
accumulate assets it also attracts people currently living outside of it to join the 
household. Both of these mechanisms would result in a household that is above the 
dynamic equilibrium to move back to it over time. We can test for these alternative 
explanations by re estimating the livelihoods function in equation 1 but using total 
household income rather than household income adjusted by household subsistence needs 
as the dependent variable. This asset index then reflects any additional assets gained by 
the household, whether or not their returns were consumed by the (original) household 
members. Redoing the analysis with this asset index did not substantively change the 
asset recursion diagrams. This suggests that social sharing rules and endogenous 
household composition do not affect the asset accumulation path. This mirrors the results 
of similar analysis for rural Pakistan and Ethiopia (Naschold 2006).  
 
A second reason why we might not see multiple equilibria is that the time period between 
observations is only one year. If total asset holdings change slowly, this may be too short 
an interval to pick up the long run asset dynamics. Indeed, the existing studies which 
have found multiple asset equilibria have either used longer spells [five year in South 
Africa (Adato et al. 2006) and thirteen years in Western Kenya (Barrett et al. 2006)], or 
are based only on pastoralists’ livestock holdings, which are much more volatile than  
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other asset holdings [see (Barrett et al. 2006) on Northern Kenya] or both [see (Lybbert et 
al. 2004) on Southern Ethiopia]. 
 
Rerunning the above analysis with a longer, three year asset index lag did not 
substantively change the results. The asset recursions diagrams continue to show a single 
dynamic equilibrium at a level very similar to the one year lags. Again, this confirms the 
results for Pakistan and Ethiopia in Naschold (2006). 
 
Finally there are two other possible, but untestable, explanations as to why the data do 
not show bifurcating welfare dynamics. First, evidence from Ethiopia (Santos and Barrett 
2006) has shown that bifurcating equilibrium paths may depend on the quality of the 
growing season. When years are good all farmers expect to be on concave accumulation 
path. In contrast, in mediocre years only some farmers, including probably the 
experienced, expect to grow, whereas others expect to fall behind. In the VLS data we 
can partially control for good and bad growing years using information on the rainfall 
pattern. However, it appears that asset dynamics in the VLS data are not substantively 
different for good and bad harvest years, though this may be a result of rainfall being a 
crude measure for the quality of the growing season. 
 
Second, the VLS covers poor rural populations. Close to 90 percent would fall under the 
poverty line recommended by the 1993 Expert Group of the Government of India. It is, 
therefore, possible that in the country as a whole there are additional higher asset 
equilibria, which are absent from the VLS data, as the VLS villages contain very few 
richer households. The only way to test for this would be to use a data set that is more 
representative of India as a whole. If indeed there were higher equilibria in other rural or 
urban parts of the country, then the findings in this paper could be interpreted as 
geographic poverty traps in the sense that there may be unique low level equilibria for the 
rural villages of the VLS.  
 
 
8  Conclusions 
 
This paper has examined household asset dynamics and tested for potential asset poverty 
thresholds in three villages in rural semi arid India. The empirical results present a 
picture of economic stasis. Absent any major shocks households in these villages are 
expected to remain at their current level of well being. This picture is confirmed by the 
low average annual growth rate in per capita asset holdings over the period 1975 to 2003 
of 0.8%.  
 
The existing theoretical literature on household welfare dynamics and most of the 
empirical case studies have focused on modeling the shape of the dynamic welfare path, 
in particular the existence of multiple dynamic equilibria and welfare thresholds. This is 
an important area of research as it can contribute to the design of more effective anti 
poverty policies and, indeed, is what motivated the improved semiparametric estimation 
technique used in this paper. However, the empirical investigation of rural India showed  
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clearly that in practice welfare dynamics can look very different from those hypothesized 
in the dynamic models and found in some of the existing empirical studies. The three 
rural Indian villages are characterized by a lack of welfare dynamics. Households’ asset 
accumulation is a very slow, almost static process approximating a random walk along 
the 45 degree line. Since in expectation households remain at their initial asset positions, 
all households with an asset position below the poverty line are effectively trapped in 
poverty. The poor stay poor. 
 
There is no evidence for non convexities either for the whole sample or any of the 
subgroups. This suggests that households in the VLS villages do not face an asset poverty 
trap in the form of multiple dynamic asset equilibria. The estimated mean asset 
accumulation path also shows very little concavity. This has two implications. First, there 
is no significant difference in the speed of asset accumulation between asset poor and 
asset rich households. And second, reducing asset inequality would only provide direct 
benefits to the recipients, but would not enhance the overall rate of subsequent asset 
growth.  
 
The mean overall asset equilibrium is around three times the lowest rural poverty line, or 
Rs1500 per adult equivalent per year in 1975/76 prices, or close to $2 per day when 
converted to 1995 PPP $. While this level is well above the poverty line and, therefore, 
may appear not too low, it is likely to understate the extent of poverty in the villages. 
Perhaps a better way of interpreting this result is in a relative context. The median 
household in the villages has already achieved the equilibrium level of well being in 
2001 suggesting that absent any changes in the welfare distribution. This suggests that the 
concurrent level of observed consumption poverty of around 22 percent is the long term 
equilibrium. 
 
When we relax the assumption that households share a common underlying dynamic 
asset accumulation path and examine asset dynamics by subgroup we find predictable 
patterns of club convergence with a single equilibrium per subgroup. Higher castes, large 
landholders and more educated households have monotonically   and statistically 
significantly   greater asset equilibria than their lower caste, smaller landholder and less 
educated peers. In addition, recent improvements in economic conditions in Andhra 
Pradesh village of Aurepalle have resulted in a higher equilibrium level of asset holdings 
that in the Maharashtra villages. 
 
Since the estimated asset accumulation path is linear in is central tendency and since even 
the best semiparametric model specification has confidence bands that straddle the 45 
degree line of long term asset equilibria over much of the asset domain, there does not 
seem to be a way for households to move towards a higher equilibrium by exploiting 
non linearities in asset accumulation. Instead, future improvements in welfare will have 
to come from structural changes that raise the asset equilibrium itself. In terms of social 
policy, the estimated linear asset dynamics also indicate that the key function for social 
safety nets is their traditional, most basic role of ensuring survival. Since there are no 
bifurcation points in the form of unstable dynamic equilibria safety nets cannot help 
leverage dynamic gains or, conversely, prevent dynamic losses.  
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(5) 
 
The u vector contains two types of random effects: the [u1,…,uK] for the spline 
coefficients with 
2 Cov( ) u σ = u I and the [U1,…,UK] for the random household intercept. 
 
Then we can estimate equation 4 as the best linear unbiased estimator of the following 
mixed model representation of the penalized spline.  
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U σ I measures the variation between households, 
2
ε σ I measures the within household 
variation, and 
2
u σ I controls the amount of smoothing used to estimate f. The partially 
linear model estimated by a mixed model representation of penalized splines combines 
the advantages of the global parametric model with the flexible functional form of a fully 
nonparametric model. 
 
The random effects semiparametric penalized splines model in equations 4 and 6 was 
estimated using the R package SemiPar (Wand et al. 2005) which estimates the 
smoothing parameter λ through restricted maximum likelihood (REML), and cross 
checked using the model selection based algorithm in Ruppert et al. (2003: Appendix B). 
 